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Abstract
The legal scholarship on relational contracts highlights the fact that
commercial transactions rely upon a large number of institutions, in-
cluding trade norms and the good reputation of industry participants.
This complexity is in contrast to the simple models that are often used
in economics analysis of the law, leading Macauley (2002) to suggest
one can view “law and economics as a desert, and law and society as
a swamp". The purpose of this paper is to show that the economic
analysis of relational contracts touches upon several elements of mod-
ern micro-economics that can be distinguished by different meanings of
the term “price” . The term “economic price” refers to the true resource
cost of a commodity, and can explain the role of standards setting by
trade organizations. “Trade price” refers to terms of trade, but can be
distorted due to asymmetric information. This effect may be mitigate
via reputational mechanisms. Finally, “contract price” refers to contin-
gent prices such as warranties, as well as legally enforceable agreements
for which courts can be asked to impose damages where there is con-
tract breach.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to briefly review current themes in economics
that are relevant for the literature in law on relational contracts. The liter-
ature on relational contract can be traced back to at least Karl Llewellyn’s
work on the U.C.C. (Uniform Commercial Code).1 A central issue is the
extent to which courts should use business norms and practices in the adju-
dication of contract disputes. Subsequent work by Stuart Macaulay (1963)
and Ian MacNeil (1974), members of the Law and Society movement, em-
phasized the value of a holistic approach to contract law. Both Macaulay
and MacNeil advocated the view that courts should take into account the
larger societal values when adjudicating cases. The result has been a lively
ongoing debate on how the courts should adjudicate contract cases.
1See Bernstein (2014a) for an excellent discussion. See also Llewellyn (1930) for dis-
cussion on the meaning of “law”.
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In addition to the law and society movement, relational contracts and the
issue of how to adjudicate contract disputes have been extensively studied
by scholars in the law and economics tradition, such as Alan Schwartz (1992)
and Richard Craswell (1993).2 This work, as exemplified by Posner (2011)’s
treatise on law and economics, uses economics to provide a unified approach
to thinking about and organizing the law. The two approaches are often
viewed as providing contrasting approaches to a similar set of issues. The
difference is beautifully expressed by Stuart Macaulay (2000) who cites a talk
by Robert Ellickson, who in turn cites Leff who viewed "law and economics
as a desert, and law and society as a swamp".3 While hopeful of a middle
ground, Macaulay (2000) goes on to argue that rational choice models and
game theory lead to an over-simplification that does not reflect the reality
of many concrete situations.
It is true that rational choice theory and game theory are central preoc-
cupations of many economic theorists. However, it is not central to the prob-
lem of economics that is broadly concerned with efficient allocation of scarce
resources. In contrast, contract law, and by extension relational contract
law, is concerned with the core economic question of ensuring the effective
production and exchange of goods and services. Macneil (2000) argues that
“understanding a transaction requires understanding all essential elements of
its enveloping relations.” Given that exchange takes place in a market econ-
omy where the prevailing prices help determine the terms of trade, MacNeil’s
position implies that in order to understand relational contracts, we need to
understand the role of prices for the allocation of resources.
The term “relational contract” in economics has come to mean the narrow
problem of modeling bilateral trade in the context of a repeated game.4 Yet,
it is evident that many of the issues that concern scholars, such as Hadfield
2See Hermalin et al. (2006) for an excellent review of how economics can be used to
inform contract law.
3Macaulay (2000), page 783.
4Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) are often credited with starting this
trend. Bull (1987)’s work relies upon the repeated game model developed by Kreps et al.
(1982), while MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) build upon the work of Abreu (1988) to
provide a complete characterization of all the possible equilibrium contracts. Recently
important work includes Levin (2003) and Chassang (2010).
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(1990) and Bernstein (1992), concern not only relationships, but also the
nature of the good and services to be governed by the relationship. In this
essay I outline the “economic” approach to economic institutions at a basic
level and introduce to a broader audience some of the “inside baseball” of
the field of economics.5 We call this “insider economics”, and suggest that
understanding these issues has become increasingly important in a global
economy where decisions based upon the advice of economists can have far
reaching repercussions.6 The essay begins with a discussion of the role of
models in economics, and then focuses attention to the notion of “price”
and how confusion over what it means has not only led to a breakdown of
communication between disciplines, but also has, in my opinion, led to some
poor policy making.
The central issue can be traced back to Friedman (1962)’s book on how
free markets may lead to better economic performances. For its time, it was
an excellent book that built upon the developments in general equilibrium
theory, particularly the two welfare theoremsdeveloped by Arrow, Debreu
and MacKenzie in the 1950s.7 As I discuss in more details below, these
results are central to modern economics and provide a normative benchmark
that is used to organize vast amounts of economic data. They show that there
is a close connection between prices in a perfectly competitive market and
5As Wikipedia states, "inside baseball" is a metaphor that “refers to a detail-oriented
approach to the minutiae of a subject, which in turn requires such a specific knowledge
about what is being discussed of which the nuances are not understood or appreciated by
outsiders.”
6See for example Madrick (2014)’s book that makes this point. As Paul Krugman
indicated in his review of the book on September 25, 2014 in the New York Times, the
points are not really new. For example Kornai (1971) pointed out many problems with
the standard theory.
7See the Nobel prize statement http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economic-sciences/laureates/1983/presentation-speech.html for Gerard Debreu
that places their contribution into context. Notice that Friedman never explicitly cites
general equilibrium theory. However, some of his ideas do seem to have been written in
the shadow of the theory. From example, the second welfare theorem states that every
efficient equilibrium can be achieved with the combination of a reallocation of initial
endowments and a competitive market. This is basically Friedman’s solution for the
provision of education using a voucher system - the vouchers addressed the problem
of access for the poor, while the market would ensure the efficient allocation of the
educational resources.
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the efficient allocation of resources. The difficulty is that “price” in general
equilibrium theory is very different from “price” in Friedman’s book, and
hence Friedman’s claims do not follow from the general equilibrium theory,
but they are an empirical claim that free markets are the best way to manage
a large complex economy.
Like Friedman, relational contract theorists also make empirical claims
- for example arguing that courts should take into account industry norms
when adjudicating a contract. Thus, I begin by discussing what we mean by
an empirical claim, and observe that such claims necessarily rely upon some
models of the world that are either explicit or implicit, and always unprov-
able. Section 2 of the essay introduces the notion of causality that is widely
used in economics, as beautifully exposited by Holland (1986). Holland ex-
plicitly makes the point that empirical claims cannot be made in the absence
of some theory. His solution, commonly known as the potential outcomes
approach, provides a way to systematically explore and evaluate different
theoretical models of the world. It has revolutionized the way empirical
work is done in economics.8
The quote from Macaulay regarding law and economics also illustrates
that economic models are often considered simplistic, and thus necessarily
false.9 It is worthwhile reminding ourselves that all models are false. Models
are simplified representations of the environment that assist us in making
better decisions.10 In general, a simple model is preferred to a more complex
model because it is easier to understand and explore empirically. Complexity
is added in response to the need to better fit the data, which, hopefully, leads
to better decisions in the future.
The second goal of the essay is to show that the notion of “price” as
it is commonly used is not sufficiently rich to capture its various uses in
8See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for an excellent up-to-date review of this approach.
9See Peierls (1960)’s discussion of Pauli who observed that models in physics are also
wrong (but useful)!
10Notice that one can always transform a model about the physical world into a decision
as to whether a statement is true or false. Even in physics false models are widely used.
Newtonian physics is widely used in engineering because the increase in accuracy by
including relativistic corrections is simply not worth the effort for most applications.
5
practice. One can usefully distinguish between at least three notions of price
in economics, each with different properties. In his comments on an early
version of this essay, Ron Burt has kindly called the paper a Rosetta stone
between the two disciplines of law and economics.11 I prefer to view the
exercise as doing what empirical people call a “crosswalk” between two data
sources/disciplines.12
Section 3 provides an in introduction to general equilibrium theory. It
provides some general conditions under which competitive equilibria are ef-
ficient. I call the prices that support efficient allocations “economic prices”.
Many economic models, particularly macro-economic models, rely upon eco-
nomic price and the associated hypothesis that markets are complete. To
distinguish between the “economic price” in a model, and the price that is
observed in the market, I call the latter the “trade price”.
Section 4 introduces the notion of the “trade price” which corresponds to
our everyday notion of the price observed in a market. If the “trade price”
corresponds to the “economic price”, then it should reflect the underlying
cost of the resource. Over long periods of time, prices do in general vary
with resource costs. However, over shorter time scales this is often not the
case.13 A good example are prices in health care markets which seem to bear
no correspondence to the underlying resource costs.14 Another example are
financial markets. As Shiller (2014) observes, asset prices are the result of
people holding a portfolio of beliefs regarding how the future will evolve, and
hence they cannot be expected to always reflect true future resource costs
11Burt made this comment at the Reputation Symposium, on September 4, at Pembroke
College, Oxford, UK. This is consistent with the goals of this journal, that since its
publication in 2005, “strive to enhance the understanding of the complex connections
between law, culture, social structure, and society by focusing on social scientific studies
of law and law-like systems of rules, institutions, processes, and behaviors.” (http://www.
annualreviews.org/journal/lawsocsci, retrieved September 1, 2014).
12The formal term is “schema crosswalk” that describes how to map between two data
bases. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schema_crosswalk.
13Another bait and switch strategy in economics is to go from the true result that
competitive equilibria are efficient when markets are complete, to the claim that more
markets are likely to make the economy more efficient. Oliver Hart (1975), in his Princeton
PhD thesis, showed that this claim is incorrect.
14See Skinner (2012).
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that they are meant to represent.
The point I wish to make here is that “economic price” is a (useful) the-
oretical concept to characterize efficient allocations. It also helps us under-
stand when competitive markets are not efficient in practice, which in turn
provides a theoretical starting point for why economic institutions (and re-
lational contracts) are needed. The notion of “trade price” is used in Akerlof
(1970)’s famous market for lemons paper. He argued that many observed
economic institutions arise because the “trade price” does not reflect the true
underlying characteristics of a good. He observes that sellers solve this prob-
lem by developing reputations for providing high quality goods. Beginning
with the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Shapiro (1983), this idea led
to a large economics literature on how individuals and firms build reputation
in markets, and the implications of this for market performances.
A key feature of this class of reputation models is that parties choose to
provide high quality products because of the impact upon future demand. In
the context of MacNeil (1974)’s work on relational contracts, this corresponds
to what he calls the “non-promissory” future of contract. He observes that
this is a complex phenomenon, which is certainly the case, as one can see
from the book length economics treatise on the subject by Mailath and
Samuelson (2006). MacNeil identifies a second class of relationships that
he calls the “promissory future of contract”, in which parties make explicit
promises today to carry out actions and transfers in the future. Akerlof
(1970) observed that such agreements in the form of warranties or other
contractual tools also provide a solution to the problem of efficient trade
when product characteristics are unobserved.
Section 5 introduces the notion of a “contract price” that is intended to
cover these sorts of arrangements. Within economics, the theory of relational
contract is typically confined to “contract prices”. This illustrates the fact
that “relational contract” in economics is a much narrower in conception than
the term used by legal scholars. The distinction between a trade price and a
contract price also illustrates different dimensions of individual reputation.
When using a trade price, a seller’s reputation is associated with the quality
of the good to be produced. In contrast, with a contract price, reputation is
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associated with whether or not individuals keep their promises and remediate
problems that arise (See Banerjee and Duflo (2000) for evidence regarding
the latter effect). The paper concludes with a summary of the arguments
and some implications for economic and legal policy making.
2 Causality and Explanation - The Rubin/Holland
Model15
When an adviser recommends policy A over policy B, she is predicting that
the future consequence of A is superior to B. How can she know this? In the
context of relational contracts, there are many examples of authors who make
predictions. Hadfield (1990) advises courts to take into account how franchise
contracts create commitment.16 Bernstein (1992) wishes to explain why
diamond dealers have chosen informal (A) over formal enforcement (B).17
Schwartz (1992) addresses the puzzle of why in some cases the courts enforce
contract terms as written (a passive strategy), while in other cases they may
not enforce clear terms, or add terms that were not in the original contract.18
In each of these cases, there is the outcome that is observed to have oc-
curred, and the potential outcome that did not occur. In every case, either
the case observed was predicted to be better than the counter-factual (and
hence explain why the decision was made), or the counter-factual decision
would result in a better outcome. This way of thinking about decision mak-
ing has been formalized by Donald Rubin, and popularized by Paul Holland
(1986)..19
The basic approach is a generalization of ideas developed for the testing
of drugs. In that case, one compares the outcomes between individuals who
are treated with a drug and those who are not. More generally, one begins




19Angrist and Pischke (2009) provide a very accessible review for social scientists, while
Imbens and Rubin (2011) provide a more theoretical development of techniques. See
Ferguson (2008) for an application of these ideas to historical analysis.
8
with a unit, i, that is being treated - it might a person, a company, a judge,
court of law, or country. The unit must then face at least two possible
treatments or decisions, which we can denote as A or B. It could be a rule
for gaps filling a contract or choosing between a court and arbitration. The
final step is to specify the potential outcomes Yi (A, t) and Yi (B, t) - these
are the outcomes that might occur after each decision. Notice that I have
added a time index to highlight the fact that the potential outcomes are
intended to occur at specific point in time.
The causal effect of decision A relative to decision B is defined by:
CIi (A,B, t) = Y (A, t)− Y (B, t) .
The causal effect of A is the difference in outcomes relative to B. The first
point is that one cannot talk about a cause, without also specifying the
outcome if the cause is not present. This seems like a simple point, but
in practice it can be quite challenging to specify carefully what may have
happened if a decision did not occur.
Notice that the definition requires comparing A and B at the same time!
In order to measure CI (A,B, t) one would have to first try option A, and
then enter into a time machine, go back one period, and then try option B.
Holland (1986) calls this the “fundamental problem of causal inference”. This
idea of learning from counterfactuals was immortalized in the film Groundhog
Day in which our hapless hero, Phil Connors played by Bill Murray, would
keep reliving groundhog day in Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, until he worked
out how to deal with his personality and connect with the heroine of the
movie, Katie, played by Andie MacDowell.
What is so important about the approach is that it forces one to be
explicit about regarding the assumptions underlying a causal claim. For ex-
ample, in the case of a drug trial, one uses what Holland calls the hypothesis
of unit homogeneity - the effect of treatment should be the same upon units
with similar characteristics. For example, to test a drug one may administer
the drug to one of two ill individuals. Notice that it is possible that the
treated person would have lived even without treatment, and hence observ-
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ing the untreated die does not logically imply that the drug saved the treated
person.
In order to come to this conclusion one needs a model, only a simple
model. For example, if the persons are identical twins, then it is reasonable to
suppose that they have similar biology, and hence the treatment is effective
for both of them.20 The case of drug trials is pretty transparent. The
potential outcomes approach is also useful for helping us understand policy
making in more difficult situations. For example, there is the claim that
human activity is causing an increase in global temperatures. Here the unit
is the world, and the treatment is the production of CO2, and the outcome is
temperature. In order to really test this claim we would need several worlds
and then try the experiment of varying CO2 output in the different worlds.
This is clearly impossible.
In science, the implicit assumption is that the laws of nature are time
invariant. This assumption, combined with detailed models of the climate, is
used to assess the impact of CO2. The impossibility of doing a randomized
trial and the complexity of the modeling exercise explain why there is so
little consensus regarding the appropriate policies for climate change.
One faces similar difficulties when studying relational contracts and the
law. The most convincing work on the effect of the law uses the United States
as a test laboratory, where changes in state laws can be used to measure the
effect of the law upon outcomes.21 Examples include Donohue and Levitt
(2001) who use variation in abortion law to look at its effect upon crime,
Kessler and McClellan (1996); Currie and MacLeod (2008) study the effect of
variations in state tort law upon medical outcomes, while Miles (2000), Autor
et al. (2004) and MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) use state variations in
employment law to study its impact upon employment and wages.
The explicit assumption in these studies is that the outcome variables
move continuously over time. One then looks to see if there is a discrete
20A more realistic example is one in which a large sample is used. In that case, one
assumes that sample population has similar characteristics to the whole population, and
hence the difference in outcomes is representative of themean outcome when a person is
chosen randomly from the whole population.
21See Bertrand et al. (2004) for a discussion of the best way to use state variation.
10
change in outcomes at the time the law is changed. It may always be the
case that the law changed in response to some other factors, as in Krueger
(1991). The challenge is to make modeling assumptions that can reasonably
stand the test of time.
Finally, in response to Macaulay’s comment on the desert of law and
economics, one is reminded of the point made by Popper (1963) in which
one cannot prove some hypotheses to be correct, but can only prove some
hypotheses to be false. One reason for the use of simple models in economics
is that we can learn as much, if not more from the failures of a model, as
from its successes. In this spirit we move on to the notion of economic price
and how it fails to explain the prices observed in a complex economy.
3 Economic Price
The fundamental theoretical building block of modern economics is general
equilibrium theory developed by John Hicks, Kenneth Arrow, and Gerard
Debreu, who all won Nobel prizes in economics for their work. The theory,
laid out beautifully in Debreu (1959)’s Theory of Value, provides a clear
definition of an efficient allocation of resources, and conditions under which
such an allocation can be achieved via the price system. The theory is
the corner stone of a modern graduate education not because it is true,
but because it provides a general framework within which it is possible to
define what one means by an efficient allocation of resources.22 There are
no normative presumptions beyond requiring that each person has a way to
evaluate the allocation of resources. The purpose of this section is to explain
what is a “price” in general equilibrium theory, and to give it the more specific
name of “economic price”. I shall also show that some of the institutions that
Lisa Berstein (2001,2014) has observed in her work on the cotton industry
and the U.C.C. can be viewed as the creation of commodities, which in turn
allows for the use of “economic price”.
22Here the term efficient is always in the sense of Pareto efficiency - there is no other
allocation that makes everybody as well off, and some people strictly better off. This is
discussed in more details below.
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Commodities
A commodity can be a good or service. The former is a tangible object, such
as food. A service would be a commodity that cannot be physically owned,
such as the stream of images one views while watching a movie. In this
setup, an asset would be some property that provides a stream of services.
For example, a pair of shoes is not a good, but an asset that provides services
to one’s feet. The distinction is meaningful because at some future point
the service might be used by one’s children (my son sometimes borrows my
shoes). The services provided by asset can be contracted upon and delivered
to different individuals over time.
The description of a commodity requires specifying the quality of the
commodity, the place, and time of consumption. In addition, uncertainty
can be introduced by allowing the commodity to be state contingent. For
example, one might buy a particular type of wheat on the Chicago futures
exchange to be delivered next year. In addition to carefully specifying the
characteristics of the wheat to be delivered, the contract will also specify
what will happen if delivery cannot occur. All these features can be viewed
as characteristics of the good.
Debreu (1959)’s definition is so strong that observed markets rarely, if
ever, trade or exchange commodities in the sense used in general equilibrium
theory. This fact is rarely discussed in undergraduate economics courses.23
The notion of a commodity is central to the notion of what is a business norm.
For example Bernstein (2001) discusses how trade norms evolve to precisely
define “cotton” as a commodity. Bernstein (2014b) also has a wonderful
discussion of a “2 x 4” - the piece of lumber that is not in fact 2 inches by 4
inches, but over time the exact size became standardized.
Once the set of commodities has been defined, general equilibrium theory
then adds production possibilities - a description of the commodities that
23Undergraduate courses do discuss imperfect markets, and specialized topics such as
the monopoly problem and principal-agent theory. Neither of these problems would be
severe if commodities were well defined. For example, monopolies are inefficient because
they cannot price separately goods delivered to different persons - see the general analysis
in Bergemann et al. (2014).
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can be produced with the available endowments of capital and labor. In the
model, labor is just another service that is purchased on a market, and hence
the production set is a process that takes services from assets such as labor
and capital to produce new commodities.
Value
The next ingredient is a model of human decision making. The model of
rational choice is a common target for criticism, as in the quote by Macaulay
illustrates. However, its power lies in the fact that it is a very simple and
elegant model of decision making. It is built upon two assumptions. The first
is that individuals have a well defined ranking over commodities. Without
loss of generality, one can begin with a finite set of choices, {A,B,C,D, ....} .
The second assumption is that if an individual prefers A over B then she will
choose A. A person is considered irrational when she knowingly chooses say
B, even though she really prefers A.
Debreu (1959) shows that under these assumptions, choices of a rational
person can be represented by assigning a value to each choice, say Vchoice. It
will be the case that choice A will be preferred/chosen to some other choice B
if and only if the value of A is greater than the value of B (VA > VB). The ra-
tional choice model is the starting point for using what Bandura (2001) calls
the agentic approach to social cognition - the notion that individuals have
goals and make decisions because of the consequence of these decisions.24
Once preferences have been defined, then the notion of an efficient al-
location is defined as a feasible allocation (one that satisfies the resource
constraints) with the feature that there is no other allocations that make
a single individual better off without harming any other.25 This notion of
efficiency is typically considered to be ethically neutral from the perspective
of individual preferences, and most economists would take the normative
24The term agentic is also used in the context of Milgram’s theory in which how indi-
viduals follow orders are in an agentic state.
25The term “Pareto efficient” is more commonly used - there is really no other notion of
efficiency that is used in economics, and hence we use the term “efficient”. There may be
other explicit criteria used to evaluate an allocation - these may or may not be efficient,
depending upon the context.
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view that, if possible, one should choose an efficient allocation. Under the
standard assumptions for general equilibrium theory, efficient allocations can
always be found, though they are in general not unique.
The purpose of the rational choice model is to provide a simple and
coherent representation of how millions of individuals in an economy will
respond to changes. It should also be noted that the model allows for inter-
personal judgments. There is nothing in the theory that bars a person from
choosing an outcome that is more equitable, even though it may lower her
personal income. The theory also allows individuals to change their mind
because a good consumed in the future is a different commodity. The strong
assumption that is often made is not rationality, but the assumption that
preferences are time invariant, namely if we could observe preferences today
that will tell us what a person’s preferences will be tomorrow.
Less well appreciated is the role of the rational choice model in modern
behavioral economics. Before the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
there had been a great deal of work that attempted to model human decision
from the ground up. A good example is the treatise by Newell and Simon
(1972). The work had little impact in economics, even though it was widely
recognized that the standard model needed to be extended. The genius
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was to begin with the standard rational
choice model and use it as a benchmark against which to measure deviations
from rational choice, rather than attempt building a new model from scratch.
This approach has been enormously influential because the rational choice
model provides a good first order representation of behavior, and hence a
good way to help organize the many deviations from rational choice that have
been observed in the literature (See Camerer et al. (2003) for a collection
of seminal articles). Next we turn to the theory of competitive markets,
which, like rational choice theory, has proven to be a good first order model
of economic activities.
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Markets and the Welfare Theorems of General Equilibrium
Theory
General equilibrium theory provides a model of resource allocation when the
set of commodities in the economy can be observed and contracted upon. In
this case, one can characterize all efficient allocations by giving each com-
modity in the economy a value per unit or a price.26 This price is a purely
technical construct that follows from the requirement of (Pareto) efficiency.
It turns out that there is a beautiful connection between these prices
and the prices in a competitive market. By a competitive market one means
a situation for which every commodity can be traded at a price, and that
prices are such that demand is equal to supply. The first welfare theorem
demonstrates that every competitive equilibrium is efficient. An obvious
concern is that competitive equilibria may be extremely unjust. For example,
Sen (1977) pointed out that one of reasons for the Bengali famine was not the
lack of food, but the fact that many households did not have the resources
to purchase food at the going prices.
These concerns are addressed with the second welfare theorem. Under the
appropriate conditions for every efficient allocation, there is a redistribution
of initial endowments, so that the efficient equilibrium is also a competitive
equilibrium. This is a very powerful idea that, as we have mentioned, can be
viewed as consistent with many of the ideas in Friedman (1962). He makes
the normative claim that a society with free markets is to be preferred over
the alternatives. He recognizes the importance of addressing inequality, and,
consistent with the second welfare theorem, advocates a redistribution of
initial endowments (such as vouchers for the provision of school services and
a negative income tax system).
Gary Becker (1976) observes that the notion of price used in general
equilibrium theory does not correspond to it’s everyday use, and certainly
does not correspond to “price” as used in a legally binding contract. Price
as used in general equilibrium theory represents the value of any constraint
26One good has to be given a numeraire price of 1 against which all the others are
measured.
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upon the set of feasible allocations. When the price of a commodity is zero,
then this means that there is more of the commodity than individuals are
willing to consume. Similarly, at an efficient allocation, pollution that is
produced is normally associated with a negative price - producing more of
the commodity lowers value.
However, this does not imply that markets with free “prices” will achieve
an efficient allocation, as claimed by Friedman (1962). The reason is that
a prerequisite for efficient trade are complete markets, , so one can measure
and price all commodities in the economy. Williamson (1979)’s influential
work observes that transaction costs are an important market friction that
make complete markets impossible.
To many this discussion may seem a bit pedantic, but general equilib-
rium theory is the intellectual foundation for modern economics. Even if
not explicitly acknowledged, the idea that efficient allocations can be char-
acterized via economic prices is very powerful. In the context of business
practices, it shows that in principle, setting standards for goods and services
in relationships makes it easier to price these commodities, and hence can
potentially increase the value of trade.
Secondly it helps explain why so many economists, when acting as ad-
visers, believe that more markets are good. For example, Greenspan (1998)
very much supported unregulated over the counter (OTC) trade in derivative
securities. He used a perfectly valid argument. The only problem was, as he
later admitted, (Greenspan (2008)) it was completely wrong! In an impor-
tant paper, Oliver Hart (1975) showed that making markets more complete
does not necessarily result in increased efficiency, and thus in theory more
markets do not necessarily lead to better outcomes.
Finally, one cannot easily escape the power of the second welfare theo-
rem. It implies that given any normative claims regarding what is a desirable
outcome can be viewed as an outcome supported by some “economic prices”.
This can tempt economists to use what Paul Krugman (2014) calls a “bait
and switch” strategy - namely to go from the true fact that efficient alloca-
tions can be supported by some set of “economic prices” to the false claim
that free markets are always efficient. To spot this strategy, we now turn to
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providing a more nuanced notion of “price”.
4 Trade Price
The notion of an economic price for a well defined commodity is quite dif-
ferent from what I call the trade price. This corresponds to the everyday
concept of a price that refers to the observed terms of trade at the time of
sale. When we speak of the price of milk or housing, it refers to a specific
category of a good, but within that category there are many different com-
modities corresponding to different qualities and locations of consumption.
The reason this is important is that while economic price always refers
to the actual value of a good, the trade price refers to the single market price
for a basket of different commodities. For example, in his famous “Market for
Lemons” paper, Akerlof (1970) considers the market for cars where they are
characterized by their age and make, but the mechanical quality of the car for
sale cannot be observed by buyers. The word “price” in Akerlof corresponds
to what I mean by a trade price - the amount one would pay for a car in this
market, but whose quality is uncertain. It is not the economic price because
cars vary in their quality, and hence cars of different quality should have
different economic prices. Akerlof showed that the trade price is equal to the
average value of low and high quality cars. This in turn creates an incentive
for owners of low quality cars to enter the market (adverse selection), while
owners of high quality cars exit the market.
If consumers understand this, then they will reduce their total demand
for cars, which, as Akerlof shows, can in some cases lead to a complete
breakdown of the market. This paper is extremely influential in economics,
because it illustrates the role that asymmetric information plays in deter-
mining the volume of trade. The assumed lack of a contract between parties
is consistent with the notion of a trade price and with the way the law treats
spot exchange. As Farnsworth (2004) observes, spot market exchange is not
normally viewed as a legally binding exchange. When the quality of the good
is not directly observable (as is the case is most complex consumer goods
such as automobiles and computers), buyers rely upon their expectations
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regarding the quality of the good.27
Akerlof goes on to discuss the solutions that parties have devised to
encourage the production of high quality goods. One of the most important
of these is the development of a reputation for quality, a point also made by
Friedman (1962). The first formal economic model of product reputation is
due to Klein and Leffler (1981). It relies upon the theory of repeated games
that is the basis of the relational contract models in economics developed
by Telser (1980) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). This approach is
not without controversy. Shapiro (1983) explicitly argues that the Klein and
Leffler approach is ad hoc.
Shapiro’s point is that a reputation should be about a time invariant
characteristic of an individual, good, or firm. Thus a firm is either good
or bad, but that the signals of quality are not perfectly observed. A firm’s
reputation is formally the probability that they produce high quality goods.
Repeated good experiences with a firm’s product leads the market to update
beliefs regarding the unobserved quality. In such market, reputations have a
selection effect. Namely, bad firms get bad reputations and are weeded out
of the market over time.
In contrast, relational contracts are based upon the existence of social
norms in the market that firms choose to adopt or not. In the Klein and
Leffler model, firms choose a combination of high quality and high prices
that together form an equilibrium in which they do not have an incentive
to cheat. Thus relational contracts are about equilibrium incentives rather
than selection. MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) apply these ideas to labor
markets and explicitly show that there is a close connection between social
norms and equilibrium employment in labor markets.
We put off further discussion of relation contracts to the next section,
and continue the discussion of trade prices using the notion of reputation
as defined by Shapiro (1983). When reputations are about unobserved and
27Under the UCC, there is a requirement of merchantability. In this example, the
assumption is that all the cars work, but the lemons simply have more problems, yet not
so much that it leads to a legal obligation on the part of the seller. A better example
might be a meal at a restaurant or a wine that can vary greatly in perceived quality, but
this does not lead to legal liability.
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time invariant characteristics, the fundamental market imperfect is a lack of
information that does not allow buyers to distinguish between commodities
with different characteristics. A prediction of this class of models is that
improving information has the potential of ensuring better pricing of com-
modities, and hence more efficient exchange. There are growing body of
work supporting this claim.
In an important study, Jin and Leslie (2003) finds that consumers vary
their demand for a restaurant as a function of posted health report cards.
What makes the study particularly convincing is that the inspection protocol
in Los Angeles for restaurants did not change. All that happened is that after
the law change, consumers were “treated” with a health report card on the
window of the restaurant (I lived in LA at the time, and certainly stopped
going to the “C” restaurants in the area). Similar work has been done for
groceries (Ackerberg (2003)), health care (Geweke et al. (2003); Chernew
et al. (2008)), eBay (Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010)) and wine (Macchiavello
(2010)).
This work illustrates that the demand for a good depends upon the in-
formation parties have regarding the characteristics of a good. This turns
out to be one feature of observed business norms. For example, Bernstein
(1992) discusses one of the important skills that traders have is the ability
to evaluate the quality of the stones they trade (page 118). In the case of
the cotton industry, section 2 of Bernstein (1996) discusses the many bright
line rules that use industry specific terms such as “prompt”, “raingrown”, and
“long staple”.28 What is interesting is that these terms are used to clarify
the characteristics of the cotton that is being delivered, including time and
quality, and hence deal with the adverse selection problem of Akerlof rather
than contract enforcement per se. This illustrates the important role that the
concept of a commodity plays in exchange. If a commodity is more precisely
defined, then this can act as a substitute for a good reputation. This is one
of the goals of the International Standards Organization (ISO), which has no
powers of enforcement, but provides a set of measurable standards that help
define commodities and assist in economics development (see www.iso.org).
28Page 1732.
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In summary, in markets that rely upon trade prices, reputation for quality
is important. However, extra-legal institutions that clarify the definition of a
commodity can act as a substitute for reputation and help solve the adverse
selection problem identified by Akerlof (1970). Before turning to the issue of
contract price, let us briefly consider what happens when reputation effects
interact with behavior.
Jin and Leslie (2003, 2009) find that restaurants as well as customers
respond to the reputation signal given by health report cards. In particu-
lar, the introduction of the ratings system led to a drop in death by food
poisoning in Los Angeles. In the context of physicians, Wang et al. (2011)
find that low quality health providers do respond to poor grades on their
health report cards. These results would seem to support Friedman (1962)’s
claim that reputation effects are sufficient to police the quality of goods in
markets, an argument that was formalized by Fama (1980).
In an important paper, Holmstrom (1999) explored carefully the inter-
action between effort and reputations. He made the following remarkable
observation. When reputation represents beliefs regarding the quality of a
good, then necessarily they include both the point estimate of quality and
how sure one is regarding this estimate. If there is very little experience with
a supplier, then one’s beliefs adjust quickly. Holmstrom observed that this
gives strong incentives for the seller to increase quality and manipulate the
beliefs of the buyer, which can lead to inefficiently high effort when a firm
or individual is building their reputation.
However, once a seller becomes well known, then she has little incentive
to manipulate her reputation, which in turn leads to low effort. Gibbons
and Murphy (1992) directly test this model with data on CEO compensa-
tion. They exploit the fact that the age of a CEO determines how many
years remain in their career and find that compensation contracts rely upon
reputation when a CEO is young and unproven. However, for the older
CEO, the compensation contract switches to more performance pay, consis-
tent with a decline in the importance of reputation effects. MacLeod and
Urquiola (2013) integrates school reputation into model of school compe-
tition. They show that this can explain that students work very hard to
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gain admission to elite schools, yet once accepted, they have much lower
incentives to work, because they are assured of a good job upon graduation.
Kreps et al. (1982) apply the reputation model to the prisoner’s dilemma
game. They extend the model by assuming that players vary in their prefer-
ences, but this is unknown to the other players. Specifically they introduce
the assumption that there is a chance that some individuals use a tit for
tat (TFT) strategy.29 They then show that there is a unique equilibrium in
which rational players mimic the TFT strategy to fool the other player to
cooperate. A feature of the equilibrium is that cooperation will break down
near the end of the game. Moreover, once an individual deviates from TFT,
then for all future plays cooperation is impossible.
These reputation models are technically very beautiful, and have been
widely studied by economists. Tadelis (1999) shows that this model can be
used to understand the market for reputations. Morrison andWilhelm (2004)
apply it to explore professional codes of behavior. Mailath and Samuelson
(2006) provides a comprehensive review of many other applications. Overall,
while preferred by economic theorists, this class of models has not been
widely used to guide and organize the empirical evidence. One reason is that
the predictions are very sensitive to the beliefs of agents, an unobserved input
to these models. However, economic data are very noisy and it is not all clear
how to make the step from these elegant models to the “swamp” of economic
data sets. Some progress is being made for experimental games where it is
assumed that agents cannot perfectly choose their strategies (Rogers et al.
(2009)).
5 Contract Price
A typical sales contract entails a seller agreeing to supply a commodity at
a future date for a well defined trade price. Contract breach occurs when
one or both parties fail to perform as promised. When breach occurs, the
29Tit-for-tat in a prisoner’s dilemma game is one where the play simply copies the play
of the other player the previous period - cooperate if the other did, cheat if the other did.
This strategy is in general not an equilibrium to the game, but Axelrod (1984) found that
it worked very well against a population of strategies submitted by individuals.
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harmed party has the right to take the dispute to a court of law. There, as
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes (1897)observes: “The duty to keep a contract
at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,—and nothing else.”30.
Thus if the seller chooses a quantity or quality different from the agree-
ment, then the payment she receives will be reduced.31 Notice that a key
feature of such a contract is that the payment to the buyer is state contingent
- it varies with the level of performance. The use of such contingent pric-
ing is one of the solutions that Akerlof (1970) observes which can solve the
adverse selection problems. This corresponds to warranties for cars in the
market for lemons. Another example is documented in Banerjee and Duflo
(2000) who observe that suppliers of software services mitigate low quality
by providing after the sale services and support - this is the remedy of “cure”
that is allowed under UCC 2-508.
By contract price, I mean any arrangements in which terms vary after
delivery, and for which there is an associated notion of breach. This is very
distinct from the notion of trade price discussed above where dissatisfied
customers must fend for themselves. The notion of a contract price is best
discussed in the context of a simple example. Such examples may lack the
richness of a case study, however. the goal is to show that small variations
in the environment can lead to significant variations in predicted contract
form.
5.1 The One Period Contract
Consider the case of a once off exchange with a contract between two agents A
and B. We keep the payoffs fixed, but by varying the context and information
structure to illustrate the impact this has upon the predicted contract form.
In some cases A might be a seller, in others a buyer. The stages are as
follows:
30Page 462.
31The common law rule for contract breach is the awarding of “expectation damages” -
an amount that ensures the promisee receives the value agreed to by the promisor.
22
1. A and B meet and agree upon a contract. If no agreement is reached
both parties get zero.
2. Individual A chooses effort pi ∈ {pib, pig}, where 1 > pig > pib > 0 that
represents the probability that there is a good outcome g. In general
this effort is not observable, though it might be with sufficient cost.
The currency is normalized so that the cost of effort pi is pi.
3. The state s ∈ {g, b} is realized. If g occurs the value of trade is
vg = β > 1, if the bad outcome b occurs then trade has no value,
vb = 0. The value of trade is assumed to be easily observable by both
agents.
4. Parties choose to trade or not as function of the state s, denoted by
qs ∈ {0, 1}, and transfers occur under the terms of the contract. The
cost of production is c and it is assumed to satisfy β − 1 > c > 0.
In this model, the only substantive decisions are the level of effort, pi, and
the trade decision as a function of the state, {qg, qb}. Working backwards we
can determine the efficient allocation for this model. If there a bad outcome,
since the cost of production is c > 0 then no trade is optimal, and hence
q∗b = 0. If the outcome is g, then since β > c, trade is optimal and hence
q∗g = 1. Given this the expected value from choosing effort pi is
W (pi) = pi (β − c)− pi = pi (β − (1 + c)) > 0.
The net return from effort is positive, and hence gains from trade are max-
imized effort is high (pig), and trade occurs if and only if the state is high
(g). The next issue is how can parties design contract prices in the shadow
of the law that achieves this outcome?
Buyer Liability
Consider a very stylized version of Bernstein (1992)’s diamond market ex-
ample. Suppose A is a buyer of diamonds and B is a seller. A feature of this
market is that the buyer is often liquidity constrained and hence prefers to
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pay the seller after he has had an opportunity to cut and sell the diamonds.
In that case, the contract would stipulate that the buyer inspect (with ef-
fort pi ∈ {pig, pib}), and take delivery. He would be required to pay after a
reasonable period, say 60 days. Given that the buyer inspects the goods,
the contract assigns all liability regarding the quality of the good with the
buyer.
Here we can suppose that β is the value of good, and c is the cost of
cutting the diamond. For simplicity, we can suppose that if the buyer makes
an error in judgment, then he may later learn that the diamond has no value
and should be sold for some other use. Under these assumptions the diamond
is sold to the buyer with no warranty at price p, and the buyer has sixty days
to pay.
In the absence of a warranty, the payoff for the buyer is:
U − buyer(pi) = pi (β − c− 1)− p.
In this case contract breach would simply be non-payment of p. Under the
standard expectation damages rule for contract, damages would be p. Since
(β − c− 1) > 0 then it immediately follows that it is optimal for the buyer
to choose high effort (pig). Thus, when the buyer is in the best position to
evaluate the quality of the good, it is optimal to have a fixed price contract
under which the buyer accepts all liability for defects. In this case the role
of the law (or diamond merchant association) is to ensure that payment by
the buyer occurs.
Moral Hazard
Next, we consider a very stylized version of Bernstein (2001)’s cotton in-
dustry. Suppose that the seller is a cotton farmer whose unobserved effort,
pi, determines whether the cotton has high quality, with benefit β, or low
quality with no value. Suppose the farmer agrees to sell a certain quality
of cotton to a firm in the future at a price p, and that the cost of delivery
is c. If the contract simply states that the farmer delivers cotton, then her
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benefit is given by:
U − seller = p− c− pi.
Under this contract the seller would choose pib.
Bernstein (2001) observes that one of the roles of a trade association is to
help provide quality standards. If upon receiving the cotton, the firm finds
that the cotton does not meet industry standards for quality, then under the
expectations damage rule, the court would order the seller to pay β to the
buyer in the event of breach. In that case the payoff would be:
U − seller = p− c− pi − β (1− pi) ,
and the seller will always choose the high effort pig.
This solution is not efficient because it always entails delivery. The op-
timal solution would have no trade if the good is substandard. Rogerson
(1984) shows that if one allows for renegotiation before trade occurs, then
we get efficient trade ex post. This may or may not give rise to efficient effort
incentives. When the bad state occurs, the gain from renegotiation is to save
upon the production costs c. The seller is obliged in this case to pay to the
buyer β under expectation damages, and thus with renegotiation, the payoff
is:
U − seller = p− c− pi − (β + c/2) (1− pi) ,
= p− β + c/2 + pi (β − 3c/2− 1) .
If (β − 3c/2− 1) > 0 then the seller chooses high effort and first best is
achieved.
Relationship Specific Investments
Consider now the case of relationship specific investments, or what legal
scholars have called the reliance interest (Fuller and Perdue (1936)).32 These
32In economics, Mincer (1962) discusses the implications of investments that are job
specific and have no value on the market. Klein et al. (1978) discuss the implications of
relationship specific investments for vertical integration.
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are post contract investments that increase the gains from trade but have no
value outside the relationship. For example, suppose Agent A is the seller,
and the investment is into cost reduction that allows her to offer a specialized
good to the buyer at a lower price. In this case the effort pi is the probability
that production costs are low. Let cb > cg > 0 be high and low production
costs respectively. Let V be the value of the good to the buyer, and zero to
anybody else. First suppose that it is efficient to trade ex post if and only if
costs are low since cb > V > cg. We can map this case into our base example
by setting β = cb− cg and c = cb−V . Suppose that the seller pays the costs
and the buyer gets V . Thus when there is trade the net value is β − c when
β is realized, and −c otherwise.
If trade is always efficient, then under a fixed price contract, seller would
like to minimize costs, which in turn leads to efficient investment. This may
no longer be the case when trade is not always efficient because renegotiation
may lead to a sharing of the rents from investment with the buyer (see Hart
and Moore (1988) for a general analysis of this case). Nöldeke and Schmidt
(1998) and Edlin and Hermalin (2000) show that efficiency can be achieved
with an option contract.
The structure of the contract is as follows. The buyer B offers the seller
A the option to sell at price p, with no penalty if the seller decides not to
sell. Suppose the price is set to satisfy:
cb > V > p > cb + 1,
then the buyer will always be happy to buy at price p. On the seller’s side,
she will supply the good if and only if she has low costs, and thus her payoff
is given by:
U − seller = pi (p− cb − 1) .
Since the term in brackets is positive, then she will set pi = pig, and we get
efficient investment combined with efficient trade.
In each of these cases, the final efficient allocation is identical. However,
the contract price used to implement the efficient allocation varies a great
deal. In the first case, enforcement was purely financial - it was up to the
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buyer to inspect the good and determine quality. In the second case with
moral hazard, the seller’s effort determined the quality of the good - there
is a fixed price combined contract renegotiation which played a crucial role
in achieving the efficient outcome. Finally, we considered a case where the
seller’s effort determines the cost of production. In that case, efficiency is
achieved with a fixed price contract that gives the seller the option to sell.
The point here is that one does not need a complex environment to gen-
erate a great deal of heterogeneity in contract form - it follows naturally
from variations in information structure. Of particular importance is the
allocation of decision rights. In the first case, the buyer has the right not
to purchase after inspection of the goods. In the second case, parties jointly
renegotiate as a function of the observed quality of the good. In the final
case, the seller has the right to sell or not. Thus, a distinguishing feature
of contract price relative to a trade price is the allocation of decision rights.
Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) show that a key feature that forms con-
struction contracts produced by the American Institute of Architects that
are used for the management of large and complex construction projects
is the careful allocation of decision rights, all of which is done within the
shadow of the law.
5.2 Relational Contracts
The purpose of this section is to review the rather narrow literature on
relational contract theory in economics. The previous section has illustrated
a number of examples of contract prices that implement efficient allocations
under the appropriate conditions. It was assumed that contract law, and the
rule of expectation damages, could be applied at low cost. There are many
situations where parties are able to productively trade even though the law
either does not work well or is prohibitively expensive to use.
Greif (1989) shows that social groups in medieval times play a crucial role
in contract enforcement, while Greif et al. (1994)’s work on the law merchant
provides historical examples of exchange that is enforced in the absence of
formal law. More recent work includes McMillan and Woodruff (1999) who
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point out the important of informal contracts in Vietnam, while Johnson
et al. (2002) highlight the complementarities between informal enforcement
and courts.
In contrast with legal scholarship we discussed above, the theory on re-
lational contract abstracts from the issues associated with economic and
trade price to focus upon the conditions under which contract prices can be
informally enforced. This work builds upon the research that applies the
prisoner’s dilemma game to social interactions. Beginning with the work of
Axelrod (1981, 1984), there is a literature that suppose life can be viewed
as a repeated game between two individuals who much choose each period
between trusting each other or cheating/opportunism. The basic idea is that
trust is sustainable if parties are in a social environment where others can
observe their behavior. This simple idea has been very fruitful and widely
applied to a variety of questions, such as Kranton (1996)’s work on sustain-
ing reciprocal trade relationships, and more recently Dixit (2003)’s work on
explaining the rise of private governance relationships.
Relational contract theory adds, not surprisingly, contract prices to this
model. The first model is due to Telser (1980), though the literature has
tended to follow the model introduced in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989).
Macleod and Malcomson consider a situation in which parties meet repeat-
edly over time, but can terminate the relationship at any point. Here I
consider a simplified version of the model that is sufficient to make most of
the important points. The key ingredient to the model is the assumption
that every period there is a future surplus V ∗ that is larger than what they
would get if they did not trade. In the event of a breakdown in the rela-
tionship, it is assumed that the firm gets U0F and the worker gets U
0
W . The
threat of breakdown of the relationship is a substitute to seeking relief in
court. As MacLeod (2007) discusses, this strategy is preferred when the cost
of using the courts system is high relative to the gains from trade.
A relational contract is an agreement between the worker and the firm
in which there is legally enforceable payment w to the worker. The worker
agrees to select effort pig. In exchange, the firm agrees to pay a bonus b if
the worker chooses pig. If the worker does not choose the high effort, then
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the firm will view the worker in breach of their agreement and will terminate
the relationship.
Similarly, if the firm does not pay the bonus, then the worker will view
the firm in breach of contract, and terminate the relationship. What makes
the contract relational is that rather than ask the court for relief, the parties
threaten to leave the relationship - this may be their only option if effort
is not observable outside the relationship. If termination occurs, then the
surplus, S∗, from future trade is destroyed:
S∗ = V ∗ − (U0F + U0W ) > 0.
If neither party breaches the agreement, then they continue to trade. As
part of their agreement, the worker gets a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus.
In practice the allocation of the future share can be achieved via a set of
trade prices. However, we adopt this formulation in order to focus upon the
important role that the allocation of future rents plays in relational contract
theory.
Consider first the firm. If no party breaches the agreement, the firm has
payoff:
U∗F = pigβ − w − b+ (1− α)V ∗ = CurrentProfit+ FutureProfit (5.1)
After the worker has chosen effort, the firm might be tempted to cheat upon
the agreement and not pay the bonus. Thus a necessary condition for this
contract to be self-enforcing is:
U∗F ≥ pigβ − p+ U0F = DefectProfit+OutsideOptionProfit. (5.2)
Notice that this implies that following incentive constraint for the firm:
FurtureProfit−OutsideOptionProfit ≥ Bonus (5.3)
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A similar situation for the worker holds:
U∗W = w + b− pig + αV ∗.
If the worker shirks, then the firm will not pay the bonus and fires the worker.
Thus, for the relational contract to be self-enforcing we have:
U∗W = p+ b− pig + αV ∗ ≥ p− pib + U0W .
This implies the following incentive constraint:
FutureUtility −OutsideOptionWorker ≥ IncentiveToCheat−Bonus.
(5.4)
These expressions illustrate that there is a connection between the divi-
sion of the rents and contract form. If the firm has a greater share of the
surplus, then it can credibly commit to a larger bonus, which in turn reduces
the rent that it must leave to the worker to provide incentives.
Consider the two polar cases. Suppose that the market for the firm is
perfectly competitive - by this we mean that the future rent for the firm is
equal to its outside option. Thus equation (5.3) implies that 0 ≥ bonus, or
there is no bonus pay. This implies that in equation (5.4) we have:
FutureUtility−OutsideOptionWorker ≥ IncentiveToCheat > 0.
In other words, the worker must receive a rent or she will shirk. This case
corresponds to the well known efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) where workers are paid a high wage, and then fired if they are caught
shirking. The rent needed to enforce the contract is generated by equilibrium
unemployment. Klein and Leffler (1981) have a similar model, though in
their case they argue that firms with good reputation dissipate rents with
wasteful advertising.
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As an empirical fact, many workers are not paid on fixed wages, as as-
sumed in these models. MacLeod and Parent (1999) show that bonus pay is
very common in the US, while Lemieux et al. (2009) document a significant
increase in the use of bonus pay since 1980. In some jobs, such as sales, more
that 50% of workers receive some form of explicit bonus pay. In MacLeod
and Malcomson (1998), we show that one can link the form of incentive pay
to the relative cost of capital and a set of labor market norms. MacLeod and
Parent (2014) present some preliminary evidence on how observed contract
form can be explained by this theory.
A robust prediction of the theory is that efficiency of the relationship is
related to the size of the rent and does not depend upon contract form. If
we add constraints 5.3 and 5.4 we get that the future value of a relationship
must be greater than the sum of the outside options by at least the size of
the temptation to cheat:
GainsFromTrade−OutsideOptions ≥ IncentiveToCheat (pig − pib) .
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) show that this condition is not only nec-
essary, but sufficient for the existence of self-enforcing relational contracts.
That is, if it is satisfied, then there exist relational contracts that implement
the efficient allocation. The form of the contract (the size of the bonus) is a
function of how the surplus from the relationship is divided between the two
parties.
There is quite a bit of evidence supporting that parties in long term
relationship can achieve more efficient outcomes than no trade despite the
lack of legal enforcement. There is a voluminous literature, beginning with
the work Flood (1952). List and Rasul (2011) and Charness and Kuhn
(2011) show that individuals in long term relationships cooperate early in
the relationship, but may defect towards the end of the game. Brown et al.
(2004) explore an experimental labor market with endogenous long term
relationships. In their model, the bonus pay feature is turned off, and they
find that successful long term relationships rely upon rent sharing to elicit
cooperation from workers.
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In an interesting paper, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2014) have a cred-
ible identification strategy that allows one to see the causal effect (in the
Rubin/Holland sense) of value V ∗ upon trade. They use the rise of violence
in Kenya as an exogenous shock to the value of the relationship in the mar-
ket for cut flowers. Since violence is not controlled by the firm, then supply
delays would be necessarily be viewed by foreign buyers as a contract breach.
Macchiavello and Morjaria (2014) find that the future value of trade does
affect the level of trade, as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). He also finds
that there is a U-shaped effect that is consistent with the learning model of
Holmstrom (1999) - younger firms work harder to supply their foreign buyers
than the long lived firms.
There are also several papers that document the importance of bonus
pay. Shearer (2004) has a very nice experimental paper demonstrating the
impact that bonus pay has upon productivity. Dohmen and Falk (2011)
provide some further evidence on the interaction between bonus pay and
gender. Falk et al. (2015) extend the Brown et al. (2004) model to allow for
bonus pay and job security. Job security in effect forces individuals into a
relational contract. They find that the addition of bonus pay dramatically
improves the effectiveness of the relational contract.
MacLeod (2007), relying upon earlier work by Schmidt and Schnitzer
(1995), shows that self-help solutions apply only when the value of the
relationship is not too high. Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) show that in
high value relationships, relational contracting may not work because parties
would renegotiate with legally enforceable contracts. Baker et al. (1994) sup-
pose that parties can use a mix of formal and informal performance contracts.
They show that in some case formal contract can enhance performance, and
predict that such a case is consistent with the empirical evidence reported
by Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) extend the model in MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1989) to allow for endogenously incomplete contracts. They show
that adding some ambiguity to a contract can increase the future value rel-
ative to no trade, and thereby increase the set of situations where relational
contracts can be used. Scott (2003) examines a last set of legal cases in the
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US, and finds some evidence that parties follow this strategy.
5.3 Current Trends
The theory of relational contracts is advancing quickly, far outpacing the
empirical evidence. Most significant are the papers that allow for more
general information structures, particularly Levin (2003), Fuchs (2007), and
Halac (2012). Levin (2002),Rayo (2007) and Doornik (2006) study the use
of relational contracts in teams, while Li and Matouschek (2013) look at
the effect of conflicts. One of the more interesting developments is models
that explore learning in the context of a relationship, particularly Chassang
(2010) and Gibbons and Henderson (2012). The next frontier will be sorting
out the empirical implications of these very sophisticated papers.
6 Summary
The goal of this essay is to help bridge the gap between the notion of a
relational contract as used in the law and society scholarship, and the more
narrow concept in the economics literature. What I learned from this exercise
is that “relational contracts” in the Macaulay/Macneil tradition is a very
broad concept that can benefit from all areas of modern micro-economics.
The main points of the review can be summarized as follows.
First, it is very common for scholars to make causal claims, such as
matters would be improved only if the courts would follow a particular rule.
Such causal claims necessarily entail using a model of the world. One of
the reasons why formal models are used is to provide a systematic way to
build and test such models. It is also worth keeping in mind that models are
necessarily false - they are decision tools that provide simplified versions of
the world around us that hopefully can help produce better decisions.
Second, normative statements regarding the allocation of resources entail
using a well defined notion of a good. Though the “commodification” of
economic life cannot be guaranteed to improve matters, it is striking, as the
work of Lisa Bernstein documents, that the definition of commodities and
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what constitute performance are important activities for trade associations.
Third, closely associated with the definition of a commodity is the notion
of an “economic price”. At an efficient allocation of resources, the economic
price of a commodity reflects the resource cost of producing that good or
service. The economic price is distinct from the “trade price”, the actual
price at which the commodity is exchanged.
The fourth point is that this distinction is important for a number of
reasons. First, it can help one spot what Paul Krugman (2014) has called a
“bait and switch” move by economists. While economic prices are associated
with the efficient allocation of resources, this is not the case with the trade
price that can correspond to a bundle of different commodities (as Akerlof
(1970) observed). Hence, there can be no presumption that “free markets”
in the sense of Friedman (1962) lead to an efficient allocation. This year’s
Nobel prize in economics (2014) was awarded to Jean Tirole, who, along
with Jean-Jacques Laffont (Laffont and Tirole (1993)), developed a theory
of regulation that follows directly from Akerlof (1970)’s work. Their goal is
to address the inefficiencies that may arise from the use of trade prices that
do not reflect the economic price of a commodity.
More generally, if markets were complete, and hence trade prices reflect
the economic price of commodities, then the only significant policy issue is
the question of inequality. Markets are far from complete, and hence there
are typically economic rents associated with trade prices, particularly when
they can be manipulated by powerful actors in the market. The fifth point
of the essay is to observe that a solution to this in the context of bilateral
exchange is to use a “contract price”. In section 5.1 we discussed the design of
efficient contract prices when parties have access to inexpensive adjudication.
An important feature of these contractual solutions is the explicit allocation
of decision rights - in other words, the allocation of power has allocative
implications, a theme that goes back to the work of Simon (1951).
The issues of power, status, and social capital are central concerns in the
sociology literature (see for example Coleman (1994) and Burt (2007)). This
analysis here suggests that these issues are intimately associated with the fact
that markets are very incomplete. The consequence is, as Macaulay (2000)
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observes, a “swamp” of variegated economic actors. There are enormous
opportunities for productive exchange between these intellectual traditions.
Highlighting the distinction between different notions of prices will hopefully
provide some context for scholars in the law and society tradition to allow
their work to better connect with work in economics.
The final section of the paper deals with some of the frontier work in
economics on relational contracts. The main lesson from this research that
is relevant to the law and society literature is that reputation is not only
endogenous, but closely connected to contract form. When a firm or indi-
vidual has a good reputation, then it is not necessary for their counter party
to have a good reputation. Performance issues can be handled via a relational
contract in which the reputable party provides the required incentives.
An important open question is how we explain the institutions we ob-
serve. A feature of relational contracts is that there are many possible stable
solutions, not all of which are efficient. We need better tools to identify
dysfunctional relationships, why they are stable, and how we can intervene
to help make them better. This is an enormous, but important task, which
will require all disciplines to work together and pull in the same direction.
References
Abreu, D. (1988). On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discount-
ing. Econometrica 56 (2), 383–396.
Ackerberg, D. A. (2003). Advertising, learning, and consumer choice in expe-
rience good markets: An empirical examination. International Economic
Review 44 (3), 1007–1040.
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for ’lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the
market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3), 488–500.
Angrist, J. and J.-S. Pischke (2009). Mainly Harmless Econometrics. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
35
Autor, D. H., J. J. Donohue, and S. J. Schwab (2004, May). The employment
consequences of wrongful-discharge laws: Large, small, or none at all?
American Economic Review 94 (2), 440–446.
Axelrod, R. (1981, June). The emergence of cooperation amoung egoists.
American Journal of Political Science 75 (2), 306–318.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy (1994, November). Subjective per-
formance measures in optimal incentive contracts. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 109 (439), 1125–1156.
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual
Review of Psychology 52, 1–26.
Banerjee, A. V. and E. Duflo (2000). Reputation effects and the limits of
contracting: A study of the indian software industry. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115 (3), 989–1017.
Becker, G. (1976). The economic approach to human behavior. Chicago, Il.:
University of Chicago Press.
Bergemann, D., B. Brooks, and S. Morris (2014, April). The limits of price
discrimination. Technical Report Discussion Paper No. 1896RR, Cowles
Foundation.
Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1998, September). Incomplete con-
tracts and strategic ambiguity. American Economics Review 68 (4), 902–
32.
Bernstein, L. (1992). Opting out of the legal system: Extralegal contractual
relations in the diamond industry. The Journal of Legal Studies 21 (1),
pp. 115–157.
Bernstein, L. (1996). Merchant law in a merchant court: Rethinking the
code’s search for immanent business norms. University of Pennsylvannia
Law Review 144, 1765–1821.
36
Bernstein, L. (2001, July). Private commercial law in the cotton industry:
Creating cooperation through rules, norms, and institutions. Michigan
Law Review 99, 1724–1790.
Bernstein, L. (2014a). Merchant law in a modern economy. In G. Klass,
G. Letsas, and P. Saprai (Eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Contract
Law. Oxford Univ Press.
Bernstein, L. (2014b, August). Private ordering, social capital, and network
governance in procurement contracts: A preliminary exploration. Techni-
cal report, Chicago Law School. mimeo.
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004, Feb). How much should
we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119 (1), 249–275.
Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr (2004, May). Relational contracts and the
nature of market interactions. Econometrica 72 (3), 747–780.
Bull, C. (1987). The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102, 147–159.
Burt, R. S. (2007). Brokerage and Clusure. Oxford University Press.
Cabral, L. and A. Hortaçsu (2010). The dynamics of seller reputation: Evi-
dence from ebay. The Journal of Industrial Economics 58 (1), 54–78.
Camerer, C. F., G. Loewenstein, and M. Rabin (Eds.) (2003). Advances in
Behavioral Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chakravarty, S. and W. B. MacLeod (2009, FAL). Contracting in the shadow
of the law. Rand Journal of Economics 40 (3), 533–557.
Charness, G. and P. Kuhn (2011). Lab labor: What can labor economists
learn from the lab? In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of
Labor Economics, Volume 4, Volume 4. Elsevier.
37
Chassang, S. (2010, March). Building routines: Learning, cooperation, and
the dynamics of incomplete relational contracts. American Economic Re-
view 100 (1), 448–65.
Chernew, M., G. Gowrisankaran, and D. P. Scanlon (2008). Learning and the
value of information: Evidence from health plan report cards. Journal of
Econometrics 144 (1), 156–174. ISI Document Delivery No.: 314XM Times
Cited: 17 Cited Reference Count: 32 Chernew, Michael Gowrisankaran,
Gautain Scanlon, Dennis P. 17 Elsevier science sa Lausanne Economics;
Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications; Social Sciences, Mathemati-
cal Methods.
Coleman, J. S. (1994). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge Mass.,
U.S.A.: Harvard University Press.
Craswell, R. (1993). The relational move: Some questions from law and
economics. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 3, 91.
Currie, J. and W. B. MacLeod (2008, May). First do no harm? tort reform
and birth outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2), 795–830.
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dixit, A. (2003, Mar). On modes of economic governance. Economet-
rica 71 (2), 449–481.
Dohmen, T. and A. Falk (2011, APR). Performance pay and multidimen-
sional sorting: Productivity, preferences, and gender. American Economic
Review 101 (2), 556–590.
Donohue, John J., I. and S. D. Levitt (2001, May). The impact of legalized
abortion on crime. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2), 379–420.
Doornik, K. (2006). Relational contracting in partnerships. Journal of Eco-
nomics & Management Strategy 15 (2), 517–548.
38
Edlin, A. S. and B. E. Hermalin (2000, October). Contract renegotiation
and options in agency problems. Journal of Law, Economics, and Orga-
nization 16 (2), 395–423.
Falk, A., D. Huffman, and W. B. MacLeod (2015). Institutions and contract
enforcement. Journal of Labor Economics 33 (3).
Fama, E. F. (1980, April). Agency problems and the theory of the firm.
Journal of Political Economy 88, 288–307.
Farnsworth, E. A. (2004). Contracts, 4th edition. New York: Aspen Pub-
lishers.
Ferguson, N. (Ed.) (2008). Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactu-
als. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Flood, M. M. (1952). Some experimental games. Research Memorandum
RM-789, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. With the assistance of Rose D. Friedman. 23 cm.
Fuchs, W. (2007). Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private
evaluations. The American Economic Review 97 (4), pp. 1432–1448.
Fuller, L. L. and W. Perdue (1936, nov). The reliance interest in contract
damages: 1. The Yale Law Journal 46 (1), 52–96.
Geweke, J., G. Gowrisankaran, and R. J. Town (2003). Bayesian inference
for hospital quality in a selection model. Econometrica 71 (4), 1215–1238.
Gibbons, R. and R. Henderson (2012). Relational contracts and organiza-
tional capabilities. Organization Science 23 (5), 1350–1364.
Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the
presence of career concerns. Journal of Political Economy 100, 30–52.
Greenspan, A. (1998, July 24). The regulation of otc derivatives. Testimony
of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board.
39
Greenspan, A. (2008, October 23). Remarks to house committee of govern-
ment oversight and reform. Wall Street Journal.
Greif, A. (1989, Dec). Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade - evidence
on the Maghribi traders. Journal of Economic History 49 (4), 857–882.
Times Cited: 79.
Greif, A., P. Milgrom, and B. R. Weingast (1994). Coordination, commit-
ment, and enforcement: The case of the merchant guild. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 102 (4), pp. 745–776.
Hadfield, G. K. (1990, Apr). Problematic relations - franchisingthe law of
incomplete contracts. Stanford Law Review 42 (4), 927–992.
Halac, M. (2012). Relational contracts and the value of relationships. Amer-
ican Economics Review 102 (2), 750–779.
Hart, O. (1975, December). On the optimality of equilibrium when the
market structure is incomplete. Journal of Economic Theory 11 (3), 418–
43.
Hart, O. D. and J. Moore (1988, July). Incomplete contracts and renegoti-
ation. Econometrica, 56 (4), 755–785.
Hermalin, B. E., A. W. Katz, and R. Craswell (2006). Law and economics
of contracts. In A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (Eds.), Handbook of Law
and Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Holland, P. W. (1986). Statistics and causal inference. Journal of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association 81 (396), 945–960.
Holmes, O. W. (1897, Mar. 25). The path of the law. Harvard Law Re-
view 10 (8), 457–478.
Holmstrom, B. (1999, January). Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic
perspective. Review of Economic Studies 66 (1), 169–182.
Imbens, G. W. and D. B. Rubin (2011). Causal Inference in Statistics and
Social Sciences. Oxford University Press.
40
Jin, G. Z. and P. Leslie (2003, May). The effect of information on product
quality: Evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 118 (2), 409–51.
Jin, G. Z. and P. Leslie (2009). Reputational incentives for restaurant hy-
giene. American Economic Journal-Microeconomics 1 (1), 237–267. ISI
Document Delivery No.: 683WC Times Cited: 21 Cited Reference Count:
29 Jin, Ginger Zhe Leslie, Phillip 21 Amer economic assoc Nashville Eco-
nomics.
Johnson, S., J. McMillan, and C. Woodruff (2002, April). Courts and re-
lational contracts. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18 (1),
221–77.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of
decisions under risk. Econometrica 47, 262–91.
Kessler, D. and M. McClellan (1996). Do doctors practice defensive
medicine? Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (2), 353–90.
Klein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchian (1978, October). Vertical integration,
appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of
Law and Economics 21, 297–326.
Klein, B. and K. Leffler (1981). The role of market forces in assuring con-
tractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89, 615–641.
Kornai, J. (1971). Anti-Equilibrium. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-
Holland Publishing Co.
Kranton, R. (1996, September). Reciprocal exchange: A Self-Sustaining
system. American Economic Review 86 (4), 830–51.
Kreps, D. M., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982). Rational coop-
eration in the finitely repeated prisoners-dilemma. Journal of Economic
Theory 27 (2), 245–252. Article.
41
Kreps, D. M. and R. Wilson (1982, August). Reputation and imperfect
information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (2), 253–79.
Krueger, A. B. (1991, July). The evolution of unjust-dismissal legislation in
the united states. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44 (4), 644–60.
Krugman, P. (2014, September 25). The dismal science ’seven bad ideas,’ by
jeff madrick. The New York Time. Sunday Book Review.
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement
and Regulation. Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.: MIT Press.
Lemieux, T., W. B. MacLeod, and D. Parent (2009, February). Performance
pay and wage inequality. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (1), 1–49.
Levin, J. (2002, August). Multilateral contracting and the employment rela-
tionship. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (3), 1075–1103. TY - JOUR
Accession Number: 0620224 . Publication Type: Journal Article. Update
Code: 200210.
Levin, J. (2003). Relational incentive contacts. American Economic Re-
view 93 (3), 835–857.
Li, J. and N. Matouschek (2013, OCT). Managing conflicts in relational
contracts. American Economic Review 103 (6), 2328–2351.
List, J. A. and I. Rasul (2011). Field experiments in labor economics. Hand-
book of Labor Economics 4, 103–228.
Llewellyn, K. N. (1930). A realistic jurisprudence - the next step. Columbia
Law Review 30 (4), 431–465. Llewellyn, Karl N.
Macaulay, S. (1963). Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary
study. American Sociological Review 28 (1), 55–67.
Macaulay, S. (2000, Spring). Relational contracts floating on a sea of custom?
thoughts about the ideas of ian macneil and lisa bernstein. Northwestern
42
University Law Review 94 (3), 775–804. Copyright - Copyright Northwest-
ern University School of Law Spring 2000; People - Macneil, Ian; Bern-
stein, Lisa; Last updated - 2011-09-06; SubjectsTermNotLitGenreText -
Macneil, Ian; Bernstein, Lisa.
Macchiavello, R. (2010). Development uncorked: Reputation acquisition in
the new market for chilean wines in the uk. Technical Report DP7698,
CEPR.
Macchiavello, R. and A. Morjaria (2014). The value of relationships: Ev-
idence from a supply shock to kenyan rose exports. Technical report,
Warwick University.
MacLeod, W. B. (2007, September). Reputations, relationships and contract
enforcement. Journal of Economics Literature XLV, 597–630.
MacLeod, W. B. and J. M. Malcomson (1989, March). Implicit con-
tracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment. Econo-
metrica 57 (2), 447–480.
MacLeod, W. B. and J. M. Malcomson (1998, June). Motivation and mar-
kets. American Economic Review 88 (3), 388–411.
MacLeod, W. B. and V. Nakavachara (2007, June). Legal default rules: the
case of wrongful discharge laws. Economic Journal 117, F1–F62.
MacLeod, W. B. and D. Parent (1999). Job characteristics and the form of
compensation. Research in Labor Economics 18, 177–242.
MacLeod, W. B. and D. Parent (2014, March 25). Transaction costs and the
employment contract in the us economy. Jouranl of Law, Economics and
Organization. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewu005.
MacLeod, W. B. and M. Urquiola (2013). Anti-lemons: Reputation and
educational quality. Mimeo, Columbia University.
MacNeil, I. R. (1974). The many futures of contracts. Southern California
Law Review 47 (688), 691–816.
43
Macneil, I. R. (2000). Relational contract theory: Challenges and queries.
Northwestern University Law Review 94 (3), 877–907.
Madrick, J. (2014). Seven Bad Ideas How Mainstream Economists Have
Damaged America and the World. Random House.
Mailath, G. J. and L. Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations:
Long-Run Relationships. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff (1999). Interfirm relationships and informal
credit in vietnam. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (4), 1285–1320.
Times Cited: 163 McMillan, J Woodruff, C 165.
Miles, T. J. (2000, Apr). Common law exceptions to employment at will
and us labor markets. Journal of Law Economics & Organization 16 (1),
74–101.
Mincer, J. (1962). On-the-job training: Cost, returns and some implications.
Journal of Political Economy 70 (5), 50–79.
Morrison, A. D. and W. J. Wilhelm (2004, Dec). Partnership firms, reputa-
tion, and human capital. American Economic Review 94 (5), 1682–1692.
Newell, A. and H. Simon (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ, USA: Prentice Hall.
Nöldeke, G. and K. M. Schmidt (1998, Winter). Sequential investments and
options to own. Rand Journal of Economics 29 (4), 633–653.
Peierls, R. E. (1960). Wolfgang ernst pauli. 1900-1958. Biographical Memoirs
of Fellows of the Royal Society 5, 175–192.
Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific
Knowledge. New York, NY.: Basic Books.
Posner, R. A. (2011). Economic Analysis of Law, 8th Edition (8th Edition
ed.). NY, NY, USA: Aspen Publishers.
44
Rayo, L. (2007). Relational incentives and moral hazard in teams. Review
of Economic Studies 74 (3), 937–963.
Rogers, B. W., T. R. Palfrey, and C. F. Camerer (2009). Heterogeneous
quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 144 (4), 1440 – 1467.
Rogerson, W. P. (1984, Spring). Efficient reliance and damage measures for
breach of contract. RAND Journal of Economics 15 (1), 39–53.
Schmidt, K. M. and M. Schnitzer (1995). The interaction of explicit and
implicit contracts. Economic Letters 48, 193–199.
Schwartz, A. (1992, June). Relational contracts in the courts: An analysis of
incomplete agreements and judicial strategies. Journal of Legal Studies 21,
271–318.
Scott, R. E. (2003, November). A theory of self-enforcing indefinite agree-
ments. Columbia Law Review 103 (7), 1641–1699. Review.
Sen, A. (1977). Starvation and exchange entitlements - general approach
and its application to great bengal famine. Cambbridge Journal of Eco-
nomics 1 (1), 33–59.
Shapiro, C. (1983, November). Premiums for high quality products as returns
to reputations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (4), 659–79.
Shapiro, C. and J. E. Stiglitz (1984, June). Equilibrium unemployment as a
worker discipline device. American Economic Review 74 (3), 433–444.
Shearer, B. (2004, Apr). Piece rates, fixed wages and incentives: Evidence
from a field experiment. Review of Economic Studies 71 (2), 513–534.
Shiller, R. J. (2014). Speculative asset prices. American Economic Re-
view 104 (6), 1486–1517.
Simon, H. A. (1951, July). A formal theory of the employment relationship.
Econometrica 19, 293–305.
45
Skinner, J. (2012). Causes and consequences of regional variations in health
care1. In M. V. Pauly, T. G. McGuire, and P. P. Barros (Eds.), Handbook
of Health Economics, Volume 2, Chapter 2, pp. 45–49. Elsevier B. V.
Tadelis, S. (1999, Jun). What’s in a name? Reputation as a tradeable asset.
American Economic Review 89 (3), 548–563. Times Cited: 24 Article.
Telser, L. G. (1980, Jan.). A theory of self-enforcing agreements. Journal
of Business 53 (1), 27–44. FLA 00219398 University of Chicago Press
Copyright 1980 The University of Chicago Press.
Wang, J., J. Hockenberry, S. Y. Chou, and M. Z. Yang (2011). Do bad
report cards have consequences? impacts of publicly reported provider
quality information on the cabg market in pennsylvania. Journal of Health
Economics 30 (2), 392–407. Wang, Justin Hockenberry, Jason Chou, Shin-
Yi Yang, Muzhe.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: the governance of
contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2), 233–61.
46
